Abstract-Consistent (pause-free) quality of service is required in peer-to-peer (P2P) video streaming systems. In this paper, we aim to eliminate the problem of playback pauses in such systems via the use of positive incentives for peers to contribute high upload rates. We model our problem as a market, where the market stakeholders consist of multiple content providers, advertisement providers, and network peers; the positive incentives for peers in the market are reduced advertisement (ad) viewing durations. From a system design perspective, one of our primary goals is to compute the market equilibria that include appropriate ad viewing durations, offering sufficient incentives for network peers to continue contributing. Our simulation-based studies demonstrate that we mitigate the "playback pause" problem for peers by up to 80% as compared to existing approaches, generate sufficient utility for advertisers to be part of the market, and enable content providers to achieve their desired utility by providing sufficient incentives for all peers to stay in the system without violating ad provider agreements.
I. INTRODUCTION
P EER-TO-PEER (P2P) based video streaming systems have been developed and deployed in order to address in an economical manner) scalability problems that exist in client-server based streaming architectures (e.g. Hulu, 1 YouTube, 2 Netflix, 3 etc.), where content providers (CPs) have to keep investing in bandwidth to provide satisfactory quality of service (QoS) to customers. However, providing QoS in P2P based video streaming systems is still challenging since the achieved performance is highly dependent on resources contributed by the peers. For instance, in a BitTorrent-like system (which is the focus of this work), a peer experiences poor QoS (where video playback proceeds with frequent pauses) when data blocks are missing from the buffer at the time they are needed for display, due to (i) a poor choice of blocks requested, on the part of the block selection algorithm and/or (ii) insufficient download rates (due to not receiving data from neighbors). To address (i), a number of efforts have developed block selection algorithms that can make appropriate block selection choices (see Section VI), with some efManuscript received May 18, 2016 ; revised September 19, 2016 and November 16, 2016 ; accepted November 23, 2016 . Date of publication December 23, 2016 ; date of current version April 15, 2017 . This work was supported in part by the NSF under Grant CNS-1423505, and in part by the Zumberge Research Award. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dr. Lingfen Sun.
forts adopting network coding mechanisms to increase the diversity of exchanged blocks [1] - [3] . To address (ii), recent efforts are focusing on building hybrid systems through integration with Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) or self-hosting video servers [4] - [6] . Those efforts tackle the problem of resource planning and allocation of CDN/server resources to achieve satisfactory QoS in hybrid-P2P systems. However, this may not always result in cost efficient solutions, as a given level of satisfactory QoS can also be achieved by instead improving peers' sharing mechanisms that in turn will require fewer CDN/server resources and hence reduce costs of profit-minded CPs.
In this work, we focus on solving the problem of insufficient download rates by improving peers' sharing mechanism, to tackle the problem of achieving satisfactory QoS in a cost efficient manner. We achieve this goal by using a game-theory driven economic approach. Such an approach is promising because, in practice, cost-effective resource planning and allocation in hybrid-P2P systems is often jointly a function of (i) the competitive interaction of multiple similar profit-minded CPs in operation and (ii) the competitive interaction of QoS-minded peers in a given CP's swarm. (In fact, other stakeholders may also participate in such hybrid-P2P systems and can be accommodated by our game-theoretic economic framework, as detailed in the remainder of the paper.) Game theory driven economics is a widely used technique for holistically analyzing systems where entities have different (often conflicting) interests. Unlike our effort, existing works [4] - [6] do not focus on such competitive markets.
To improve peers' sharing mechanisms, we first need to understand the cause of insufficient download rates. In this work, we focus on the BitTorrent protocol because it is the most popular P2P protocol and provides the general foundation of a number of widely used P2P systems today; e.g., CoolStreaming [7] , the widely used block-driven P2P streaming protocol, and Popcorn Time 4 both adopt a BitTorrent-like protocol. (Another widely used P2P system is PPLive [8] ; however, the details of its design are not publicly available.) In such systems, an important reason for low capacity peers having insufficient download rates is that a significant amount of the bandwidth is contributed by high capacity peers, who in return receive most of the download rates due to incentive-based sharing mechanisms, leaving the low capacity peers with less than sufficient download rates. For instance, a Tit-for-Tat (TFT) type strategy is often used in BitTorrent file-sharing systems, where receiving higher download rates by peers is used as an incentive to encourage them to contribute their upload resources, and where lack of contribution consequently results in longer download time for peers. However, in BitTorrent streaming systems, TFT type strategies result in poor QoS for lower capacity peers 4 "Popcorn Time," [Online] . Available: http://popcorn-time.to/ 1520-9210 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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that experience frequent video pauses [9] - [11] , while higher capacity peers have more than needed download rates. Moreover, significant variations in peers' upload capacities could also result in video pauses for higher capacity peers, particularly during transient network congestion or transient periods of poor wireless connectivity. This is due to the fact that traditional TFT-based mechanisms reduce the download rate of a peer with current low upload capacity, regardless of how significant its upload contributions were earlier. The reduced rate is sufficient to cause video pauses. As a practical example, when multiple hosts access the same wireless network simultaneously, the throughput of all hosts is determined by the lowest transmission rate among all wireless hosts. This leads to a problem known as the performance anomaly of 802.11 and degrades upload capacities of wireless peers [12] . It is during these periods of poor connectivity (which could last longer than 10 minutes [13] ) that even higher capacity wireless peers suffer from low download rates under a TFT-type strategy.
To solve such video pause problems, earlier efforts [14] - [16] have focused on using differentiated video quality to incentivize peers to increase overall upload bandwidth capacity through layered coding mechanisms, such as multiple description coding (MDC) and scalable video coding (SVC). These mechanisms are designed to: (i) allow a peer to view videos at a quality corresponding to its download rate, subsequently reducing its chances of experiencing video pauses, and (ii) incentivize peers to contribute more upload resources (if they want to view higher quality videos) to help low capacity peers who need more download rates for satisfactory QoS. With respect to (i), viewing poorest quality of videos still does not prevent low capacity peers from experiencing video pauses. For instance, a previous effort in [17] showed that more than 9% of peers cannot completely download video blocks for the base layer in time for playback even when all peers have homogeneous bandwidth capacities. With respect to (ii), increasing the overall upload supply does not necessarily increase the download rates of low capacity peers since high capacity peers would be rewarded with higher download rates due to the TFT-type strategy in BitTorrent [18] . Thus, differentiated video quality is not always a promising solution since the received download rates depend on the sharing mechanisms in P2P-based video systems. Therefore, ideally, we need a mechanism that allows higher capacity peers to obtain sufficiently high download rates so that they can first experience streaming (nearly) without pauses, and then (after achieving high QoS) if possible, "release" whatever additional download rates they might have to peers with lower download rates.
To this end, our solution is to provide proper incentives, which motivate peers to reallocate more than sufficient download rates from high capacity peers to peers with insufficient download rates (see Section IV). Previous efforts [19] , [20] proposed credit-based mechanisms, where peers earn credits by distributing video blocks to others and pay credits for receiving blocks from others. However, in these types of mechanisms, where incentive is based on upload capacities, if low capacity peers cannot earn sufficient credits (due to their low upload capacities) to pay for receiving the required download rates for smooth playback, they will still experience video pauses even when some peers are incentivized to contribute more upload bandwidth. Thus, to solve the video pause problem, our approach is to base incentives on the amount of download rates that high capacity peers contribute to helping low capacity peers.
Since high capacity peers will increase their risk of experiencing video pauses when reallocating download rates to low capacity peers, our incentive mechanism should also require low capacity peers to "pay" proportionally to what they have received from high capacity peers. Following this design goal, such incentives could take several forms. For instance, credits and points can still be the incentive.
In our work, we propose an Ad-driven Streaming P2P ECosysTem (ASPECT) that aims to eliminate the problem of playback pauses by adopting reduced advertisement (ad) viewing durations as a positive incentive for peers to provide high upload rates because: (i) peers are generally used to viewing ads for streaming shows; some service providers (such as YouTube and Hulu) offer free on-line video delivery services but force customers to view fixed duration ads (i.e., of the same duration for all users) at the beginning or in the middle of a video in order to sell ad periods to ad providers in return for revenue, (ii) peers can immediately observe a reduction in the duration of viewed ads after they increase their bandwidth contributions, and (iii) the business of commercials is a complete ecosystem.
When enabling CPs to utilize P2P networks through using ad durations as incentives, an important challenge is as follows. How can a CP determine allocation of CDN/server resources in order to compete with other CPs, while determining appropriate ad durations that will incentivize peers to continue contributing as well as be satisfied with their received QoS? To this end, with peers, ad providers, and CPs as stakeholders involved in the ASPECT ecosystem, we mould ASPECT into a market-based model with the goal to satisfy all stakeholders. In this market, the CPs play a non-cooperative game amongst themselves through combining results from the peers' game to maximize their utility, which is a function that is increasing in (i) the number of peers staying in their systems and (ii) the minimal ad durations viewed by all peers, and decreasing in the investment for video server capacities. Moreover, the peers play a non-cooperative game amongst themselves, each being selfish and wanting to maximize their utility, which is a function that increases with the received download rates and decreases with the length of ads they have to view.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows. 1) We design ASPECT as a market-based model in an oligopoly competition setting that consists of a set of CPs, a set of ad providers, and a set of peers, and show that ASPECT is able to achieve market success. (The monopoly scenario, where one CP designs incentives for peers without being concerned about competition from other CPs, has been addressed in our previous work [21] .) Conditioned on the existence of an equilibrium point in the peers' game, ASPECT provides sufficient incentives for high capacity peers to "release" their download rates in return for viewing shorter duration ads. At the same time, ASPECT allows low capacity peers to improve their QoS without significantly increasing their ad durations. Overall, our approach achieves market success, where (i) the CPs are able to make their desired profit while providing sufficient incentives for their peer customers to stay in the system and contribute to greater revenues of the CPs via ad viewing, and (ii) the ad provider ad duration contracts are respected (see Section III). 2) We show that video pause problems can be experienced by every peer, whether of low or high capacity. Thus, within ASPECT, we propose to use ad duration as a new incentive and introduce new sharing mechanisms to allow peers to trade their capacities and ad durations, thereby nearly eliminating video pauses by increasing download rates for all peers (see Section IV). All proposed mechanisms work in a completely decentralized manner, without the need for additional support from CPs.
II. OVERVIEW OF ASPECT
In this section, we present an overview of our ASPECT system. We also state our proposed peer reward mechanism and discuss the importance and challenges of designing such a mechanism that could jointly satisfy all CPs, peers, and ad providers. An illustration of ASPECT is given in Fig. 1 .
A. Architecture of ASPECT
As in traditional hybrid P2P systems, CPs invest in video servers (private video servers and CDNs) to guarantee QoS to customers and make deals with video providers for broadcasting video content. Since a CP delivers video streaming services for revenue, it might charge its customers a monthly fee or have its customers to view ads (or both). Peers subscribing to CPs obtain some initial blocks from the CP's video servers and then exchange blocks with other peers. Here, we assume that a CP also uses servers to deliver ads through a P2P-based mechanism. Ad blocks are shared and consumed similarly to video content blocks, at the same playback rate. Thus, video pauses might also occur during ad viewing.
As in TV commercials, we use fixed-length ads in the middle of videos, as shown in Fig. 2 . However, like YouTube, we allow viewers to skip ads after a specified skip point. Ad providers have agreements with CPs for the minimal duration of ads (L m ) viewed by all peers; thus, the default skip point (L D ) should be beyond the agreed-upon length, L m . The fixed-length ads should also not exceed a common upper bound, L M , in order to prevent peers from leaving the system due to frequent interruptions. For instance, the length of current ads on TV is ≈ 31% of real content [22] . Thus, a CP has a fixed ad duration interval at its disposal within which to operate.
B. Peers in ASPECT
In general, peers have heterogeneous capacities (both upload and download), which results in receiving different download rates, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . ASPECT aims to provide sufficient download rates to all peers by creating the following incentive principle: a CP rewards peers that "release" some of the download capacity ("due to them") to the system, with shorter ad durations (see Section IV).Peers that "acquire" this "released" download capacity from the system are asked to view longer ad durations. However, even though we have a mechanism for peers to release their download capacity in order to reduce their viewed ad lengths, they still need appropriate incentives to do so. For instance, if peers cannot significantly reduce the duration of ads, they will not continue to release their download capacities. On the other hand, if peers have to view significantly longer duration of ads for only a small improvement in QoS, i.e., fewer playback pauses, peers might not want to stay in the system at all. Therefore, it is important to strike an appropriate balance between ad durations and QoS improvement.
C. Content Providers in ASPECT
In ASPECT, a P2P-based ecosystem, a CP could attract more high capacity peers to contribute their upload capacities by showing them shorter ad durations, thereby eventually reducing the former's investment in video servers. However, the minimal ad duration could directly affect the revenue of CPs. As illustrated in Fig. 2 
D. Ad Providers in ASPECT
An ad provider is a product manufacturer that interested in selling its products. Typically, ad providers play their roles after CPs have deployed their platforms and locked-in customers. Such ad providers would ideally wish to buy ad viewing periods from CPs that (i) have potentially more customers that buy ad-based products, and (ii) can make users view longer ads. Consequently, profit-minded CPs compete with one another on (i) and (ii). The competition can be modeled as an auctionbased game, where each ad provider maximizes their utility by competing for CPs (potentially with a high number of peers and sufficiently long ad durations). The results of the competition would determine which ad providers can show ads on which CPs. However, it is complicated to model the peers' preference for ads, and this preference seems to be a second-order factor affecting the peers' engagement in the swarm (as compared to the peers' preference for ad lengths and reward mechanisms, which are first-order factors determining the number of peers in a swarm). Thus, we simplify the model by not considering directly the game among ad providers, and combine the utility of CPs with the utility of ad providers together, since both share the same goal of having more peers and longer ad durations.
Even though in ASPECT ad providers compete for CPs on minimal ad durations, our payment model is like the one adopted by YouTube Advertise [23] , where the real payment is based on real peer engagement (i.e., the overall ad durations peers have viewed). This also motivates CPs to show longer ad durations and supplements existing rationale to attract ad providers.
E. Trading Download Capacity With Advertisements
For the purpose of trading download capacities with ad viewing, we define a reward mechanism that provides satisfaction to all peers. The reward mechanism consists of a function for properly calculating ad durations based on peers' contributions. Thus, if peer n releases ΔD n ≥ 0 amount of unnecessary download rates, it will be rewarded with a shorter ad duration. On the other hand, if a peer obtains a better QoS by receiving −ΔD n ≥ 0 amount of released download rates, it has to view a longer ad in return. Based on this function, if the default ad duration before the skip point is L D , then the actual skip point assigned to peer n, L n , is calculated as
where λ > 0 is the parameter used for translating download rate to ad length. For simplicity, in this paper we use a linear function for L n ; this assumption can easily be extended to a number of non-linear functions (e.g., a convex function). In order to provide sufficient incentives for peers to pursue the change in ad durations, we need to find a proper combination of L D and λ that will result in peers experiencing a sufficient QoS improvement if they view longer duration ads, or have peers receive sufficient reductions in ad durations if they release download rates. With a simple reward mechanism, we can eventually find some combinations of (L m , L M , L D , λ) that enables all peers to have sufficient download rates and differentiated ad durations. However, it is difficult to tell which combination of (L m , L M , L D , λ) can make all peers satisfied with their download rates and ad durations.
Moreover, the combination of (L m , L M , L D , λ) could also affect the revenue of CPs and ad providers. Thus, for the ecosystem to exist, it is insufficient for a reward mechanism to only focus on satisfying a subset of stakeholders, i.e., the peers, rather than the entire set. For instance, if CPs only focus on peers, their ad periods might not be attractive to ad providers. Moreover, only focusing on selling ad periods would result in peers viewing intolerably long ads. To this end, we first model ASPECT as a game-basedmarket. We then realize ASPECT in the context of a real protocol -namely a BitTorrent-like video streaming system, with modifications that help us achieve the desired incentives (see Section IV). In order to address this challenge, we resort to dynamic game theory (see Section III) for arriving at the ideal parameter settings for the reward mechanism, i.e., to determine appropriate L D and λ values that jointly satisfy all ASPECT entities including peers, CPs, and ad providers. A summary of notation used throughout this paper is given in Table I . Our extensive simulation-based study of ASPECT's performance is described in Section V. In this section, we design market games to determine proper parameter values [for the reward mechanism in (1)] that provide sufficient incentives for peers to participate in the system and at the same time jointly satisfy the interests of content and ad providers, thereby ensuring market success. This section is structured as follows. We first describe the market environment. We then formulate the utility functions of the players/stakeholders in the market. Finally, we describe the details of our proposed games, appropriate to specific market types, and explore the notion of market efficiency.
A. The Market Environment
In our market setting, we consider multiple CPs, multiple ad providers, and a set of N peers interested in on-demand videos. Those videos can be streamed as single-layer videos with constant bit rate C v or as multi-layer videos with the minimal required bit rate C v (which is the bit rate for the base layer in SVC techniques). Here, we use constant bit rate (CBR) videos because it has been shown that using variable bit rate (VBR) videos does not significantly improve performance of BitTorrent systems due to the use of fixed-size blocks in the BitTorrent protocol [24] , [25] . Since our goal in this paper is to solve the video pause issue that is due to insufficient download rates, we use CBR to focus on the sharing strategies in BitTorrent systems. (Few results exist on efficient transmission of VBR chunks in BitTorrent; solving this problem is beyond the scope of this paper.) Thus, as long as a peer can obtain a download rate greater than C v , that peer experiences no video pauses. (In real systems, peers might still experience video pauses due to inappropriate order of block downloads, which is not the focus of this work.)
To provide service, CP i invests in servers (private video servers and CDNs), that provide a total upload capacity of O , to attract more contributing peers to stay in its swarm, thereby reducing its investment in video servers, while at the same time improving its revenue by selling ad periods to ad providers. (A monopoly market scenario with only one CP is discussed in our initial work [21] .) Thus, an important focus of our work is to ensure that CPs keep more peers in their system under longer minimal ad durations, in order to attract greater ad provider revenues. (The competition among ad providers is not the focus of this work.) This in turn also reduces CPs' infrastructure costs, i.e., by relying on peers to deliver streaming video content (via P2P technology) to other peers. However, longer ad durations might repulse peers and encourage them to move to other swarms in oligopoly scenarios. Thus, we design the utility functions of CPs to align with those of the ad providers (since they share the same goals), and subsequently make the swarm size and ad duration length the salient parameters of the utility function of CPs (as discussed in Section III-C.1).
A peer is a rational, strategic player, that wants to maximize its utility (as discussed in Section III-B.1). Based on the received download rate, D n , peer n uses its utility function to choose (i) the amount of download rate, ΔD n , it wants to release/receive (benefit), and (ii) the length of ads it has to view (cost). If a peer experiences video pauses or is unsatisfied with the received ad duration, it might switch to another CP.
B. Noncooperative Game Among Peers
Here, we first introduce the peers' utility functions, and then describe the game setting when all peers have decided in which swarm to participate. (In the oligopoly setting, peers can change their swarm in every round.) 1) Peers' Utility Functions: Peers' utility should be based on the amount of video pauses and the length of ads they need to view. However, for peers with different capacities, one second of video pauses might be due to a different number of video blocks missing. Thus, we need a better metric to distinguish between video pauses. Since, in ASPECT, we only consider video pauses arising due to insufficient download rates, we can relate the amount of required but not received download rate (subsequently triggering video pauses) to our metric. If a peer needs a higher additional amount of the download rate, to meet the required video bit rate, then this peer will experience more frequent video pauses. To be more general, since some peers might prefer to obtain higher download rates, we extend this metric to the received download. To this end, we define the utility of peer n, U n , to be a linearly separable function of its achieved download rate and its ad duration.
We first model peer n's benefit from its download rate as a monotonically increasing concave function (i.e., a Cobb-
where γ represents a peer's preference. Here, b is the normalized received download rate
where f (C v ) is the normalization function based on the minimal required video bit rate C v . f (C v ) is used to guarantee that all utilities are in the same range.
Peers are happier if they view shorter ad durations, and are unhappy if they have to view longer duration ads. Without loss of generality, we can also model the cost (in a sense a negative utility) to peer n of viewing ads as a concave function, U ad n (a), as in (2), where a is the normalized length of an ad. Based on the amount of download rate released (received), peers receive a deduction (increase) in their ad viewing durations. Thus, a is defined as
where parameter λ "translates" download rates to ad lengths. Based on the benefit and cost functions, U rate n (·) and U ad n (·), the utility function of peer n, U P n , is defined as
where ρ, υ, and c are constants used to guarantee that U P n ≥ 0. ρ and υ are chosen such that
where (6) provides us with the condition when a low capacity peer would be willing to increase its ad viewing duration to increase its download rate. Failure to satisfy the above condition for a low capacity peer would result in it preferring video pauses over an increase in its download rate. (Note that peers can be diverse and not every peer might care to mitigate video pauses.) We define the peer utility in this way because it is very difficult to restrict certain conditions in a CRS (constant returns to scale) Cobb-Douglas function, as used by CPs (see Section III-C.1). For instance, there is a specified download rate requirement, C v , for peers not to experience video pauses. Some low capacity peers should have higher utilities when they can increase their ad viewing durations by no more than a certain amount ( L M 2 in our setting) for receiving C v amount of download rate. However, it is difficult to define such a preference in the CRS model. Thus, in our work, we achieve this preference by using (6) to find the coefficients for properly combining two CobbDouglas functions of one variable, which might not satisfy the quasi-concavity assumption.
For simulation purposes, we choose ρ and υ to satisfy (6) when γ b = γ a = 0.5, such that at least half (due to γ b = γ a = 0.5) of the peers (without loss of generality) will satisfy (6), i.e., half of the population of peers would be of the mindset to prefer a short ad duration even when they experience video pauses. However, there are still many pairs of (ρ, υ) satisfying (6) with γ b = γ a = 0.5. Here, we randomly pick one pair of (ρ, υ) with the minimum value of ρ/υ. (When we set the value of ρ/υ, different pairs of (ρ, υ) are simply scaled.) Finally, we choose c to guarantee that all peers' utilities are greater than or equal to zero. In practice, to maximize peers' utilities, our proposed P2P mechanisms enable peers to adjust their contributions (ΔD n ) according to their preferences (see Section IV).
2) Game Setting Among Peers: We consider the game setting where peers in the swarm play a dynamic multi-round non-cooperative game amongst themselves, where the goal is to find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) [28] vector of download rates for individual peers (as depicted in Fig. 3 ). An SPNE is a final Nash equilibrium (NE) outcome of a dynamic multi-round game, where each round has a NE. The reason for modeling a dynamic multi-round game is that the equilibrium obtained from a single game round may not be sustained over time due to players taking into account the history of their game play in every round to improve their utilities. The strategy parameter for the peers in every round of the game is the download capacity they want to release to (or receive from) the system, to satisfy their QoS, where the download rate of a peer is a function of its upload contribution. Each round of the game results in a NE and takes into account the equilibria peer strategies from the previous round to arrive at the current NE. Rounds of the game are repeated until the game converges to SPNE. The details of peers' game have been discussed in our initial work [21] .
C. Noncooperative Game Among Content Providers
In this section, we focus on an oligopoly setting, that consists of a set I of competing CPs, each i ∈ I hosting video servers with maximum upload capacity, O C i , and competing with each other to attract peers. We first introduce the CPs' utility functions, and then describe the game setting modeling competition among CPs.
1) Content Providers' Utility Functions:
Unlike the parameters used in the peer utility function, that can be directly controlled by peers alone, all parameters used in the CP utility function are determined by the reactions of peers to the decisions made by CPs. We define the utility of CP i as U C i , which is a function of the number of peers in its swarm, the minimal ad duration, and upload bandwidth supplied by its servers. Here, we again use the Cobb-Douglas function with three variables to model the CP utility as a monotonically increasing concave function of its variables, i.e., for CP i
where P is the normalized number of peers, L is the normalized ad duration, and O is the normalized upload bandwidth supply. κ, μ, σ are output elasticity parameters of the respective CP utility function variables and denotes the percentage change of CP utility divided by the percentage change of the respective variable. For example, if κ = 0.4, a 1% increase in P would result in a 0.4% increase in U C i . In this work, we have performed extensive experiments to evaluate and study the effects of all (discretized at intervals of 0.1 for purposes of simulations) parameter combinations (that satisfy this relation) on market efficiency. Due to lack of space, in Section V-B, we only discuss a couple of representative scenarios, i.e., parameter combinations, that represent the entire discretized parameter space.
We define P , the normalized number of peers, as
where P i is the number of peers joining the swarm of CP i and P G is the total number of peers in the market environment. Many factors influence peers' decisions to stay in a swarm or to switch to another one, including the video bit rate, the variety of video content, the service fee, the frequency of video pauses, and the ad duration. However, the variety of video content provided by a CP is determined by the nature of the policy and cooperation among video producers, something that is not easy for a CP to change dynamically. Therefore, we mainly focus on the frequency of video pauses and the ad duration as factors contributing to a peer's decision to stay in a swarm, and use the variety of video content as an input argument that is used by a peer to decide when it wants to switch swarms.
As we have discussed before, if more high capacity peers attracted by short ad durations join the system, a CP could reduce its investment in servers, in turn increasing its net revenue. So, we define O as the normalized upload bandwidth supply
where O C i is the maximum bandwidth supply by CP i , and ΔO C i is the amount of unused bandwidth. We set the range of O to lie in [1, 2] instead of in [0, 1] to discourage CPs from eagerly pursuing decreases in bandwidth investment, but rather to utilize all of their upload supply (if needed) to satisfy a sufficient level of QoS for its customers to stay in the system, thus earning revenue. However, if the minimal ad duration is too short, the CP will have reduced opportunity to increase net revenue through payment via ad providers because only a small set of these providers would bargain for the ad period. Thus, we define L to be the normalized ad duration
where L i m is the achieved minimal ad duration and L i M is the maximal ad duration at CP i . Like peer utility functions exhibiting different preferences, i.e., different γ values, CP utility functions also exhibit different preferences, i.e., different values of the (κ, μ, σ) tuple.
2) Game Setting: In this model, we have a multi-round dynamic game setting (as illustrated in Fig. 4) , where a peer can strategically maximize its utility by changing its download capacity as well as by choosing the best fitted CP. Here, we adapt the concept of fictitious play, i.e., a time-averaged technique [29] in the theory of learning in games, and assume that each CP does not know the utility functions of other CPs and peers. A CP can strategically maximize its utility by changing its number of peers, upload bandwidth supply, and ad duration, based on the reward mechanisms announced by other CPs and peers' contributions in the previous round of the game.
Here, a peer n evaluates its potential CP i with a score
where
is the peer utility due to an ad duration, L i n , viewed by peer n at CP i (here, lower is better; see Section III-B1), and U content n (v i ), a concave function as in (2) , is the peer valuation of the number of video content (v i ) provided by CP i (here, higher is better). It is evident that the lower the score E i n (shorter ad durations and more video content) for CP i , the greater is the inclination of peer n to move to CP i 's swarm. Here, we only consider the number of videos, v i , to be the sole argument of U content n () due to the difficulty in modeling other factors (such as the categories of video content) quantitatively. In our evaluation, we allow peer n to jointly consider the number of videos hosted by CP i as well as its provided ad duration when this peer has received acceptable QoS in a former CP k 's (k = i) swarm; otherwise, the peer will only take the ad duration of the potential new CP into consideration because the amount of content is less important when peers cannot view videos smoothly. Hence, we assume that each peer behaves in a homogeneous manner in different CP swarms, and that other CPs act similarly to the peer's current CP. Thus, peer n will use the value of released upload capacity in the current swarm to compute the estimated ad duration, L n , in other swarms. (Here, we assume a CP will announce its reward mechanism to all peers.) A peer continues evaluating all CPs and keeps switching from one CP to another, from round to round, if the evaluation score for a new CP is (i) δ h % less than that of the current CP under sufficient QoS, and (ii) δ l % less than that of the current CP when this peer does not have sufficient QoS. (We use threshold values here to avoid oscillations between rounds.) We set the threshold higher (δ h ≥ δ l ) for peers to switch swarms when they have sufficient QoS because peers are likely to stick to the service that already provides them with satisfactory QoS.
As discussed above, CPs not only strategically compete with each other to attract peers, but also intend to increase their revenue by decreasing their video server capacity and selling ad periods to more ad providers. To this end, a CP has to search for a proper reward mechanism to maximize its utility. We assume that each CP knows other CPs' reward mechanisms from the last round of the multi-round game between them. Based on peers' contributions in the present game round, a CP adjusts its reward mechanism and assumes that peers which do not have video pauses do not leave the system in the next round, while peers that experience video pauses only leave the system if other CPs can provide ad durations which are more than δ l % (this comes from the peer choice for switching swarms) shorter than what it provides. Thus, the CP maximizes its utility via trading off the number of peers (P i ), the minimal ad duration (L i m ), and the amount of unused server bandwidth (O i C ). The algorithm for a CP to maximize its overall utility is given in Fig. 5 .
In each round of the game, each peer determines its CP and plays a non-cooperative game with other peers in the swarm by using the reward mechanism determined by the CP in the previous round. Subsequently, each CP maximizes its utility via adjusting its reward mechanism based on the result of the peers' game in an equilibrium state and the equilibrium reward functions of its competitors in the previous round. This multi-round game is repeated until it converges to a SPNE of reward functions for the CPs and download capacities for the peers.
3) Reaching Equilibrium and Market Efficiency: An equilibrium point of the game here represents the point where no peer tries to change their swarms and capacities, and no CP tries to change its reward mechanism. Since, in this game, we maximize the sum of utilities for all players in the market, this equilibrium point also corresponds to market efficiency [26] .
In this work, we are focusing on practical modeling of addriven streaming P2P ecosystems, so we resort to simulationbased experiments to (i) deal with pure strategy Nash equilibria, and (ii) work with arbitrary utility functions, both of which are practically desirable for a diverse set of applications. We do not provide a mathematical proof for existing NE because our peer utility function does not necessarily satisfy the quasi-concavity assumption, which in turn is necessary for guaranteeing a pure and/or mixed strategy NE in theory [30] - [34] . (The mathematical proof for existing NE in non-quasi-concave utility functions is still a difficult open problem.)
IV. SHARING MECHANISMS IN ASPECT
In Section III, we gave an overview of our market-based model, which determines parameters for the reward function in (1) to provide sufficient incentives for peers to trade download rates and ad durations. Here, we focus on the mechanisms that provide peers the ability to trade download rates and ad durations (according to their preferences) in the context of a BitTorrent-based streaming system. As mentioned in Sections I and III, we only consider CBR single layer video streaming so as to highlight (in a clear manner) the benefits of our proposed mechanisms. Moreover, we propose a decentralized method to quantify peers' contributions in order to provide differentiated ad durations.
A. Peer Selection Mechanism
Before proposing our modified mechanisms, we first describe our abstraction of the BitTorrent-like video streaming system. We view the system as operating in slotted time (with a time slot of length T ). At the beginning of each time slot, peers determine to whom they should send requests and which of their neighbors' requests to grant. Given the asymmetric nature of upload/download capacities in users' connectivity, we assume (as is typically done) that the available download capacity of peers is not the bottleneck, i.e., the download rates acquired by peers are determined by the available upload capacity. 6 Specifically, during time slot t, peer n has download rates, D t 1,n ...D t m n ,n , from its m n neighbors. These download rates are a function of the neighbors' upload capacities and a peer selection algorithm (see below). For instance, a peer receives high download rates if it has a relatively higher upload capacity than peers nearby. Given videos with a constant bit rate (C v ) for one time slot of playback, peer n's total download rate should be greater than or equal to the video bit rate, i.e., In a traditional TFT-based strategy, a peer ranks neighbors according to the provided download rates and then unchokes several of them that provide the greatest download rates (we refer to this decision process as a "Peer Selection" mechanism in the remainder of the paper). This strategy works reasonably well in file-sharing applications since the effect on low capacity peers is simply longer download times. However, in streaming applications, this is likely to result in video pauses, i.e., a much more significant degradation in QoS. When a peer experiences transient upload capability drops, using the download rate from the previous time slot as an indicator in selecting neighbors for unchoking may significantly decrease the download rate of the peer. Therefore, to reduce the degradation of video quality (in the form of pauses) caused by transient upload capacity degradation, our approach ranks neighbors according to their reputation scores, which are calculated from a combination of neighbors' historical contributions and current download rates experienced by this peer. The use of historical contributions for reputation scores is needed to absorb the effects of a transient capacity drop.
We define A t k,n as the average download rate (i.e., historical contribution) obtained by n from neighbor k (up to but not including slot t); here, we only consider download rates greater than zero when calculating this average, as we would like to reflect the average upload capacity of neighbor k. 7 We use I t i,n ∈ {0, 1} to indicate whether or not peer n obtains a non-zero download rate from neighbor k during time slot t, i.e., I t k,n = 1 indicates that the download rate is greater than zero. Then, the average download rate obtained by n prior to time slot t from neighbor i is defined as
We then define the reputation score S t k,n of neighbor k as
6 However, if wireless peers experience bandwidth losses caused by the performance anomaly of 802.11, the download rates of these wireless peers are determined by the wireless transmission rates of access points (APs). 7 A download rate of zero might just mean that two peers did not share blocks during a particular time slot. where β t k,n is a weight used to determine how much to account for historical contribution versus the recent one. We use a nonzero value of β t k,n when a neighbor actually needs help and a zero value otherwise. Considering historical contributions is helpful to neighbors that are experiencing a down-turn in upload capacity, not to those who are experiencing the return of their upload capacity or those whose capacity has been relatively stable. Thus, we set 0 < β We use a simple example, as depicted in Fig. 6 (where peer k experiences a temporary drop in its bandwidth) to illustrate our approach. Here, Fig. 6(a) illustrates the evolution of D t k,n , i.e., as peer n observes its neighbor k, and Fig. 6(b) illustrates the corresponding evolution in neighbor k's reputation score (where the dotted line corresponds to the original TFT-based approach and the solid line represents our proposed modification). That is, in response to the drop in k's upload rate, the original TFTbased approach simply tracks k's upload rate, whereas our approach decreases k's reputation score gradually. As a result, k's chances of obtaining blocks from peer n (during its transient bandwidth losses) are higher with our approach; this results in better overall performance, as detailed in Section V. Once k's capacity increases again, both approaches quickly track this improvement.
We note that if peer n's perception of node k's bandwidth loss is due to k becoming a free-rider (i.e., this loss is not transient), then eventually k's reputation with n will drop as well. We also note that our mechanism requires only local information and hence works in a decentralized manner, just as the original TFT-based approach.
B. Modified Peer Request Mechanism
Traditional Peer Request mechanisms allow every peer to maximize its download rate by requesting data from all its neighbors. However, with a TFT-type strategy, peers only unchoke a fixed number of neighbors (those with higher contributions) to whom they upload data. Thus, high capacity peers are likely to have more blocks, which in turn means that they are likely to get more requests from all other peers. In contrast, low capacity peers are unlikely to be selected (for receiving blocks) over a high capacity peer; they also have a smaller probability of receiving requests from high capacity peers, due to owning fewer blocks. Hence, peers with similar capacities are likely to form a cluster and mostly exchange blocks within this cluster [18] . As a result, low capacity peers may experience significant video pauses (due to slowly filling buffers) and may even leave the system (almost regardless of which block selection algorithm is used).
In order to shift unneeded download rates to low capacity peers, we take the following approach. When excess download rate (i.e., more than the required rate) is perceived by a high capacity peer n, given appropriate incentives (see Section III-B.1), n forgoes on requesting blocks from some of its high capacity neighbors (i.e., those that provide n with high download rates). We refer to this as "releasing" a neighbor, and attempt to release as many neighbors as possible without affecting the quality of n's video playback. The details of our modified mechanism were proposed in our initial work [21] .
C. Advertisements Reward Function
As discussed in Section III, appropriate duration of ads is a good incentive for motivating peers to continue contributing upload capacity while releasing unneeded download capacity. Specifically, in our approach, the length of peers' ads can be reduced as a reward for helping their neighbors or increased as a penalty for being helped by their neighbors. The mechanism used to compute rewards and penalties is detailed next.
Rewards: As described in Sections IV-A and IV-B, a peer helps its neighbors by (i) maintaining the neighbors' reputation scores at higher levels (as compared to their recent upload contributions) when these neighbors temporarily experience poor connectivity, and (ii) donating its download rates by releasing neighbors (as described in Section IV-B), thus allowing neighbors to obtain higher download rates and maintain QoS. A peer's reward is computed based on the amount of help provided through these two mechanisms to its neighbors. For the first type of help, we define the difference between the reputation score S t k,n and the download rate D t k,n as the amount of help provided by peer n to its neighbor k. However, such help is not really useful unless it results in peer i being selected to receive data blocks. If we let J t k,n ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether neighbor k receives blocks from peer n during time slot t, then n's reward W t n at time t will be
For the second type of help, we say peer n releases R t n neighbors in time slot t. If peer n did not release neighbor i, the expected download rate can be estimated as A t i,n , which is the historical average download rate from i. Thus, when peer n stops requesting from peers based on their (historical) average download rates (from high to low) and releases the first R t n neighbors, the donation from peer n at time t is estimated from those released neighbors as
Consequently, the total reward that peer n could obtain can be computed as (11) where m n is the number of n's neighbors.
Penalties: A peer's penalty corresponds to the download rates a peer obtains as a result of its neighbors' "donations". Given the decentralized nature of our system, it is difficult to determine how much a neighbor's donation eventually increases a peer's download rate. Therefore, we use peers' local information to estimate this benefit, based on an expectation of how much download capacity a peer would not have obtained without our approach, as detailed next.
As discussed in Section IV-B, peers form a cluster with neighbors that have similar capacities and consequently seldom exchange blocks with peers from other clusters, other than through optimistic unchoking [35] . Thus, we treat the download rates obtained by peer n from peers in higher capacity clusters, other than those obtained through optimistic unchoking, as being obtained due to "donations" made by higher capacity peers. Consequently, to determine the amount of download rates obtained through "donations", we need to determine how much is obtained through optimistic unchoking. To this end, we approximate the probability of a peer being chosen (to receive data) by neighbor k through optimistic unchoking by
where m k is the number of peer k's neighbors. It has been shown that most peers will soon learn and build connections to the maximum number of peers allowed by the system, typically 80 neighbors in BitTorrent systems, when the system enables peers to exchange their neighbor lists periodically with others [36] . Based on this, we can assume that all peers have a similar number of neighbors; that is, in Fig. 7 , we set m k = m n , ∀k. Thus, if peer n obtains a download rate of D t k,n from a higher capacity neighbor k in time slot t, then we estimate the "donated" download rate (from k to n) as being
What remains (before we can characterize the overall penalty) is to determine an appropriate cluster for each peer. We do this based on historical data, i.e., the average download rate, A t k,n , of neighbor k. Specifically, given that peer n's average upload rate to a neighbor is O n , we consider neighbor k to be in the same cluster with peer n if
, where α is a scaling parameter. Since a peer only receives "donations" from neighbors in clusters with higher capacities, we only account for a "donation" when it comes from a peer with a download rate higher than α * O n . Thus, the total average download rates from higher capacity peers is P t n , as detailed in Fig. 7 . In our experiments, we set α = 1.5 as the high upload capacities are at least 1.5 times higher than the low upload capacities, as listed in Table III . (In real systems, service providers can adjust this value according to their users' bandwidth capabilities as typical users are unlikely to change their upload bandwidth frequently, except for transient bandwidth drops.)
The duration of ads: Once we determine the reward and the penalty, we combine them in computing the duration of ads a peer should view. Given an ad period, to be viewed after every I time slots of content, the CP determines the default total ad duration, L D , and divides it equally among the ad periods. According to the contract, a CP has a lower bound, L m , and an upper bound, L M , for the total ad duration to be viewed by a peer. Thus, if there are L ad periods, the actual ad duration in the j-th period to be viewed by peer n, L n,j , is determined as follows:
where t j is the start time of the j-th ad period. We note that our mechanisms for computing rewards and penalties require only local information, and thus do not require the use of central servers or information exchange between peers, which are needed in [37] .
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we perform simulation-based experiments, in a controlled environment, in order to demonstrate the characteristics of our mechanisms and gain insight and understanding of the corresponding system. We first show the achieved QoS and ad durations of our proposed sharing mechanisms in a BitTorrentbased system. Then, using experiments on oligopoly markets, we show how CPs can design their ad policies [through the reward function in (1)] to provide greater incentives for peers to contribute to the system.
A. Performance of Modified BitTorrent-Based System
In order to illustrate the achieved performance of our proposed mechanisms, we implement all peer client and server functionalities where simulated peers actually exchange information and data (as real peers do). However, since this is a simulated environment, peers do not actually play the videos, but only check that the required content is in the buffers when it is needed. A video pause is detected if it happens that a required block is not in the buffer. A summary of system parameter settings used is given in Table II. 1) Environment Settings: To make sure that video pauses are not due to not having sufficient overall resources, but are rather due to inappropriate allocation of those resources, we only focus on experimental settings where there is sufficient total upload bandwidth to satisfy the total download demand. In our experiments, we set the total number of peers to 500, based on traces from the PPLive Project [38] . Upload capacities of peers are drawn from the distribution given in Table III . We consider single-layer video with CBR encoding, where the video bit rate is set to 500 kbps, as measured in [39] ; however, we do address heterogeneous streaming rates in Section V-A.4. According to [40] , the average video viewing time per a user's visit is more than 22 minutes. Thus, for simplicity of exposition, we assume that there is no peer churn in our 30-minute simulation period. However, peers in our experiments experience upload bandwidth losses due to, e.g., anomaly in wireless connections and network congestion (see Section IV-A for details). To simulate such losses, we choose a percentage of peers in our experiments that experience capacity losses (as detailed below). According to [13] , most wireless sessions are shorter than 10 minutes, and inter-arrival times of wireless users are highly varied. Moreover, as measured in [12] , the wireless transmission rates decrease exponentially when more users join the same wireless local area network. Therefore, for each peer experiencing capacity losses, we generate multiple durations of losses from a uniform distribution, each of which is no more than 10 minutes. We have no free-riders in our experiments (as that is not the focus of this work). Given these settings, the total upload capacity is sufficient for all peers to view video playback smoothly, if the upload resources are allocated properly.
According to [22] , the current TV ad length is ≈ 31% of real content. For instance, in our 30-minute simulation period, there is typically ≈ 23 minutes of real content with ≈ 7 minutes of ads. So, we set the maximal ad duration (L M ) to 7 minutes. The minimal ad duration (L m ), default ad duration (L D ), and λ are obtained from our market-based model.
The primary evaluation metric, used in the remainder of this section, is the percentage of time a streamed video is paused, defined as follows. Given N peers in the system viewing video over time T s , if the total length of video pauses experienced by peer i during this experiment is V i , then the percentage of video pauses for all N peers in the system is computed as
In order not to have initial "warm-up period" results skew the outcome, we run each simulation for 2400 seconds, and only record the results from the last 1800 seconds, where each peer has already connected to around 80 neighbors and peers already formed their clusters. Moreover, most simulation results presented in this section are obtained with 95% ± 5% confidence intervals. 8 Due to lack of space, we only show a subset of our results in what follows; however, results for other settings are qualitatively similar.
2) Buffer Starvation: In this experiment, we show (a) how severe the video buffer starvation problem can be when peers' upload bandwidth fluctuates, and as a result that (b) peers with lower capacity experience frequent video pauses. We refer to a peer that is experiencing transient bandwidth losses as an "inconsistent capacity peer" in the remainder of the paper. We simulate the baseline approach, i.e., the original BitTorrent-like video streaming system, and vary the percentages of inconsistent capacity peers, where the number of inconsistent capacity peers in each upload bandwidth class is drawn from the distribution given in Table III . We record the percentage of video pauses of different classes, i.e., as in (13) but on a per class basis, as shown in Fig. 8 , which illustrates that the video buffer starvation problem can occur even when there are no inconsistent capacity peers; this happens due to peer clustering (as described in Section IV-B). For instance, low capacity peers experience more than 3 minutes of video pauses in a 30-minute video (such as a typical TV show), particularly peers in the 256 kbps class, who experience almost 4 minutes of video pauses. On the other hand, high capacity peers seldom experience a video pause. When the number of inconsistent capacity peers increases, peers, except very high capacity peers, experience more video pauses due to their decreased upload capacities, which in turn decreases their opportunities to obtain data. For instance, peers in the 512 and 768 kbps classes only experience a few video pauses when no inconsistent capacity peers are present, but do experience twice as many video pauses when more than 40% of the peers in the system are inconsistent capacity peers. This degradation of QoS is not only due to the decrease of peers' download capacities but also due to the decrease of download rate due to the TFT-type mechanism behavior. This problem is particularly severe for low capacity peers -e.g., peers in the 256 kbps class experience ≈ 5 minutes of video pauses when 40% of the peers in the system are inconsistent capacity peers. High capacity peers, however, only experience very few video pauses even when 40% of the peers in the system are inconsistent capacity peers because the high download rates enable high capacity peers to cache blocks, allowing toleration of transient bandwidth losses. These experiments demonstrate that buffer starvation (and subsequent video pauses) is potentially a significant problem in P2P-based streaming systems.
3) Peer Selection Modification:
The results of Section V-A.2 illustrate that video pauses increase when the number of inconstant capacity peers increases. In this experiment, we demonstrate that our Peer Selection mechanism can reduce video pauses due to bandwidth losses. Specifically, we depict the percentage of video pauses experienced by peers in different classes using our proposed mechanism (as compared to the original BitTorrent-like system) in Fig. 9 . In order to explore the sensitivity of our results to different settings of β, we demonstrate the performance under different β values (of 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9). As shown in Fig. 9 , our mechanism significantly reduces video pauses for all peers, even when giving historical information a small weight (β = 0.1). As expected, higher values of β degrade peers' reputation scores slower, resulting in better playback quality, i.e., significant reductions in video pauses under longer durations of poor wireless connectivity (particularly with β = 0.9) are obtained. However, our mechanism cannot insure that the video pauses of high capacity peers are eliminated due to the decrease of the download transmission rate, which is possibly lower than the required download rate. On the other hand, peers with very low capacity are not able to obtain much benefit from our mechanism because, even though our mechanism does help increase low capacity peers' download rates, it, of course, cannot increase the download rate beyond what they had to begin with (i.e., before experiencing transient bandwidth losses). Hence, low capacity peers cannot increase their reputation scores above those of high capacity peers; as a result, they are unlikely to be unchoked. As noted earlier, in Fig. 9 we demonstrate that higher values of β result in better QoS. Higher values of β result in a slower decrease of the reputation score of an inconsistent peer, resulting in a diminished effect of bandwidth drops. However, if the value of β is too high, it would delay appropriate communication of the bandwidth drop to a peer's neighbors. For instance, if β = 1, then any decrease in the reputation score will be delayed by an entire time slot. Consequently, we use β = 0.9 as our default setting in the remainder of the paper.
4) Combining Mechanisms:
In our initial work [21] , we have demonstrated that our proposed Peer Request mechanism can significantly reduce video pauses experienced by low capacity peers. Here, we combine the two modifications (Peer Selection and Peer Request mechanisms), and show that the combined approach can further reduce video pauses as compared to the original BitTorrent-like system, as illustrated in Fig. 10 . In summary, our Peer Request mechanism significantly reduces video pauses for peers that were not able to obtain sufficiently high download rates to begin with. Moreover, our Peer Selection mechanism reduces video pauses for peers that suffer such pauses due to bandwidth losses (typically higher capacity peers, whose probability of being unchoked by its neighbors would dramatically decrease due to bandwidth losses).
Although in our experiments only single-layer video is used, our approach can be easily extended for systems with heterogeneous streaming rates through the use of layered video coding. The main difference in systems with heterogeneous streaming rates is that high capacity peers may prefer to use their "unneeded" capacity to view higher rate (and hence quality) videos rather than release it in order to reduce the duration of ads viewing. However, as measured in [41] , the highest bit rate used in most video streaming systems is smaller than the rate of many cable Internet connections. Hence, as long as high capacity peers are interested in viewing shorter duration ads, low capacity peers can still obtain increased download rates from high capacity peers through our mechanism. 
5) Duration of Advertisements:
In this experiment, we set the default ad duration (L D ) to 6 minutes and λ = 0.134 (based on the empirical results obtained from our earlier work [21] ), to adjust the duration of ads (see Section IV-C). We record the duration of ads viewed by different classes of peers, with 10% of inconsistent capacity peers. As shown in Fig. 11 , lower capacity peers view more than the default length, while higher capacity peers view significantly shorter duration ads. However, since the increased/decreased duration of ads is proportional to the expected download rate change (refer to (11) and Fig. 7 ), peers will have significant differences in their ad durations (e.g., peers in the 2048 kbps class always release peers with highest capacities, resulting in significantly decreased ad durations). Therefore, with ASPECT, a CP can still satisfy requirements from ad providers (i.e., delivering the minimal duration of ads), while incentivizing peers to contribute resources by offering differentiated ad durations to peers, based on their resource contributions as well as the amount of received resources.
B. Numerical Experiments With Oligopolistic Markets
In this section, we show how the market efficiency point helps CPs design reward mechanisms in order to attract peers to stay in the swarm within an oligopolistic market competition. Due to space limitations, we only show the results from a triopoly market, where three CPs compete for 500 peers. Moreover, we use δ h = 20 and δ l = 10, which are the thresholds for peers to switch swarms (see Section III-C.2), in the following experiments. (We tried many threshold combinations in our experiments. Since all of them show similar results, we only show one combination here.) The results of other market settings, like a duopoly market or oligopoly markets with more than three CPs, are similar to the triopoly case.
1) Preferences of Content Providers:
In this experiment, we show (a) how different preference settings of CPs' utility functions affect the policies of showing ads, and (b) how different reward policies affect the number of peers staying in the swarms. To this end, we consider a homogeneous situation, where all three CPs have equal video server capacities and the same amount of video content but have different preferences on the factors of their utilities [ (7)]. In this case, we have each CP put the most emphasis on a different factor, with results shown in Table IV . As we can see from the table, different preference parameter combinations result in similar numbers of peers attracted, with small differences between CPs arising due to their heterogeneous preferences. For instance, CP 3 focuses more on the number of peers compared to CP 1 and CP 2 , so it has the most peers through its strategy, relative to the other two. CP 1 , however, focuses on minimizing its video server upload supply, so it uses a longer default ad duration to encourage its peers to release unneeded download rates. Therefore, the gap between L D and L m in CP 1 is the biggest. It is important to note that CP 2 and CP 3 have the minimal ad duration value close to the default ad duration due to them having less preference for reducing video server capacities. Lastly, it is not surprising to see that CP 2 has the largest L m , since its preference is to maximize ad durations. Consequently, since the goal of our work is to encourage peers to contribute resources, we will make the preference of minimizing video server upload supply (as in CP 1 ) our default setting.
2) Importance of Video Content and Upload Supply: As discussed in Section III, peers choose CPs according to the amount of video content and the length of ad durations provided. Since video content is not a variable easily adjustable, in this experiment, we show how CPs can utilize their ad durations to attract peers. Thus, in this case, all CPs have the same default preference settings, but both, CP 1 ad CP 2 have 40000 videos, and CP 3 has only 20000 videos. However, CP 1 has a video streaming capacity of 5120 kbps, whereas CP 2 and CP 3 have a streaming capacity of 10240 kbps. As shown in Table V , the results significantly depend on the amount of video content, i.e., CP 1 and CP 2 have more peers than CP 3 . However, even though CP 1 and CP 2 have the same amount of video content, the video upload supply makes the two CPs choose different policies, resulting in a significant difference in the number of peers. CP 1 has a lower video streaming capacity than CP 2 , so it is motivated to reduce its ad durations to attract more peers and make them contribute upload bandwidth. An interesting observation here is that CP 3 has the longest ad duration. This shows that a small CP with less video content could still survive in the market by increasing its value of minimal ad durations, thereby attracting more ad providers. Therefore, the amount of content is an important factor that dominates the resulting competition between CPs, but at the same time, increasing video server capacities (to decrease the ad duration for low capacity peers) enables a CP with less content to survive in the market.
C. Overhead and Complexity
Here, we discuss the empirical overhead and complexity of our sharing mechanisms and the market-based model.
1) Modified Sharing Mechanisms:
Our modified peer selection mechanism has little overhead due to recording historical information and computing the new scores (instead of using current information directly), while our modified peer request mechanism does not increase the time complexity (for releasing high contributing peers) since the TFT mechanism already makes a peer keep ranking its neighbors based on their contributions, in order to decide whom to unchoke.
2) Market-Based Model: As depicted in Section III-C, CPs use the algorithm in Fig. 5 to repeatedly adjust their reward mechanisms, L j D and α j , each round of the game, in order to maximize their utilities until reaching an equilibrium state; thus, the time complexity of our market-based model significantly depends on the search range parameter δ, the number of peers, and the number of CPs. We first consider a scenario, as illustrated in Fig. 12 , where 2 CPs are competing for a different number of peers under various values of δ. With respect to δ, the number of iterations for reaching an equilibrium state decreases significantly when we extend the search range by increasing the value of δ from 0.1 to 0.2, with diminishing returns once δ ≥ 0.3. Moreover, the number of iterations decreases with the increase in the number of peers. This is because CPs have no unused bandwidth when too many peers are in the system, resulting in CPs having fewer options (unused bandwidth to leverage) to maximize their utilities.
To support this observation, our next experiment considers scenarios where a different number of CPs are competing for the same number of peers when δ = 0.2. As shown in Fig. 13 , as the number of CPs increases, each CP has more unused bandwidth (since fewer peers subscribe to one CP), resulting in needing more iterations to reach an equilibrium state. However, we observe that the increase in iterations with 2 CPs is due to peers oscillating between CPs when fewer peers (fewer than 1000) are in the system. This is due to the fact that each CP adjusts its reward mechanism slowly when it only has one competitor. Empirically, we observe that our market-based model converges quickly to a market equilibrium and typically needs around 6 iterations when the search range parameter δ = 0.2.
VI. RELATED WORK
P2P-based video streaming systems still rely on contributions from a small set of high upload capacity peers in order to provide reasonable QoS. Providing incentives for peers to contribute their capacities, in the hope of improving QoS, is a focus of many existing efforts with a variety of approaches [14] , [37] , [42] - [44] . For instance, the work in [14] focuses on coding/MDC schemes in the context of TFT-type strategies, where peers contributing higher upload rates are rewarded with higher video quality. In [42] , the authors propose a score-based incentive mechanism by converting users' contributions into scores and mapping scores into ranks, used by a peer selection mechanism for choosing which neighbors to upload to. The authors of [37] propose a system using ads as an incentive, which uses a token-based scheme for trading data between peers. Peers contributing greater upload resources can obtain tokens to reduce ad viewing time. Moreover, unlike our effort (which is decentralized and uses only information local to a peer), this work requires the use of a central server and information exchange between peers. However, none of these works guarantee to improve QoS of low capacity peers.
There are also a number of efforts focusing on QoS in BitTorrent-like systems [45] - [49] . For instance, the works in [48] , [49] suggest that the block selection strategies should favor blocks that are closer to the current playback point. (These works on block selection strategies are orthogonal to ours, and we believe ASPECT can be integrated with those proposed in [48] , [49] .) The analysis in [45] indicates that a TFT-based strategy may not be suitable for Video-on-Demand (VoD) applications, because younger peers may not have sufficient data to share with older peers, resulting in overloading of older peers. Consequently, in [46] , algorithms are proposed for load balancing requests between peers. In [47] , peers increase the number of neighbors chosen during random selection when such peers already have high QoS. At a high level, this is similar to our effort, in a sense of allowing peers to not be purely selfish. However, in [47] the authors do not provide incentives for peers to do so, and it runs the risk of decreasing the download rates (and hence QoS) of high capacity peers, due to lowered contributions to their high capacity neighbors. In contrast, ASPECT does not decrease the high capacity peers' ability to obtain blocks in time to avoid video pauses. Rather, we provide incentives for high capacity peers to help others, when they are able to.
Another effort [50] designs a semi-distributed algorithm to optimize fairness among peers in P2P live video systems. In its optimum case, low capacity peers have to contribute all of their capacity, but high capacity peers only have to contribute a portion of their capacity (although still higher amount than that of low capacity peers) for maintaining system performance. Thus, low capacity peers (overall) contribute less than high capacity peers while obtaining the same QoS.
Since providing sufficient incentives for peers to contribute their resources is very important, some efforts use game-theoretic approaches to design incentive mechanisms in P2P file-sharing applications [51] - [53] . By analyzing generalized Prisoner's Dilemma model, [51] has shown that the adoption of shared history and discriminating server selection techniques enables strategic users to reach nearly optimal levels of cooperation. In [52] , a resource distribution mechanism and a generalized incentive mechanism are proposed to provide service differentiation based on the amount of information provided by each peer. The work in [53] studies an incentive mechanism for resources that are shared among peers with non-direct relations and differentiate the service level based on every peer's previous behavior. Moreover, [54] adopts an evolutionary game approach in P2P video systems to study the cooperation among geographically neighboring peers, in order to improve video quality. [20] also proposed a game-theoretic framework to model peers' behavior and design incentive mechanisms to achieve cheat-proof and attack-resistant cooperation in P2P live streaming social networks. However, all of those efforts only consider the interaction among peers. None of them consider the strategies of other entities which enable the whole system to continue providing services.
In summary, ASPECT differs from the above described efforts in that it reduces video pauses by "shifting" download rates from high capacity peers to low capacity peers while encouraging this "donation" by providing fewer ads to peers who do that. The total amount of ad viewing remains constant as the peers that take advantage of these "donations" view more ads in return for improved QoS. Moreover, the incentive mechanism in ASPECT is designed to not only take peers' satisfactions into consideration, but also that of content and ad providers by achieving market efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed an Ad-Driven Streaming P2P Ecosystem (AS-PECT), in the context of P2P video streaming systems, for peers to donate their (unneeded) download capacity, in order to improve overall QoS in the system. To support such "re-allocation" of resources, we proposed a modified Peer Request mechanism, that facilitates donation (by peers) of potentially available download capacity. To provide appropriate incentives, we viewed the P2P-based video streaming system as a dynamic market-based model, that encourages peers to release their download rates for shorter ad durations. Our simulation-based experiments demonstrated that ASPECT can significantly reduce video pauses, thus increasing QoS. Moreover, ASPECT enables the content provider to achieve its desired profit by providing sufficient incentives for all peers to stay in the system without violating agreements with the ad providers (i.e., ensuring that a prespecified minimal duration of ads is viewed by all peers).
In this paper, we focused on the block exchange progress; thus, we only considered a single channel (i.e., users in a swarm sharing the same video), and used a simple block selection mechanism designed for video streaming. However, our work can be easily combined with other block selection mechanisms as well as extended to a multi-channel scenario.
